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1. CGIAR-How it all began 
Partners against Hunger-Consultative Group on International Agricul- 
tural Research (The World Bank, 19861 draws on the experience of 
Warren C. Baum as chairman of the CGIAR for 10 of its 15 years of 
existence. Baum, a World Bank vice president, traces the CGIAR’s 
origins and development and discusses how it is organized and man- 
aged, the issues it faces, and the lessons that can be learned from its 
experience. Below is a brief summary of events leading to the forma- 
tion of the CGIAR in 1971, as extracted from the book’s first two 
chapters. 
The 1960s and early 1970s were a period of widespread public and 
scientific concern that rapidly rising population in developing coun- 
tries would soon outstrip the world’s capacity to provide food. The 
Malthusian threat of a world food crisis, which gained considerable 
credence in the mid-1960s, has now retreated. Among the factors that 
produced this result, one was the evolution, with the support of the 
international aid community, of an agricultural research system to com- 
bat hunger in large parts of the developing world. 
A few eminent men, drawn from international organizations, 
national governments and private foundations, devised an innovative 
system to fund and manage agricultural research. Each of the centers 
constituting the system was to be both autonomous in management and 
international in character. This new breed of research centers, loosely 
joined together, would work under the umbrella of the CGIAR, an 
informal, voluntary association of donors, operating without a legal 
charter on the basis of a sense of common purpose. 
Early cooperation 
The first cooperative effort in international agricultural research was 
begun in Mexico in 1942, jointly by its government and the Rockefeller 
Foundation. Henry A. Wallace, who as vice president-elect represented 
the United States at the November 1940 inauguration of a new Mexican 
president, played a leading role in this initiative. A former secretary 
of agriculture and an Iowa corn breeder with worldwide recognition, 
Wallace spent a month in Mexico during which he talked with leading 
agricultural officials. Wallace’s advocacy of work to raise yields of food 
crops to improve living standards eventually persuaded the Rockefeller 
Foundation to take up agricultural research to complement what it was 
doing in Mexico in the area of public health. 
Rockefeller sent a four-man team to Mexico, led by J. George Harrar, 
who later became president of the foundation. Norman Borlaug, who 
won a Nobel prize in 1970 for his work, took charge of the wheat- 
breeding program in 1945. His early research ran into a yield plateau. 
In 1953, he obtained from Orville Vogel at Washington State University, 
a few seeds of semi-dwarf lines made from crosses between U.S. 
domestic varieties and Norin 10 from Japan. The Japanese variety was 
the result of work on dwarfing, going back at least to 1870, which 
J. George Harrar 
culminated in the release of Norin 10 to the country’s farmers in 1935. 
After a first unsuccessful attempt, a new Mexican variety with high- 
yield potential in tropical areas was evolved in 1955. It took another 
seven years of experiment before the first Mexican semi-dwarf varieties, 
Pitic 62 and Penjamo 62, were released for commercial use. 
India’s work on Mexican wheat varieties, with seeds made available 
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture for world-wide trials, was already 
showing promising results when Borlaug visited the country and 
neighboring Pakistan in 1963 at the invitation of their governments. 
Semi-dwarf wheats were first planted extensively in the two countries 
in 1967. The harvests moved the trend of wheat productivity decisively 
upward, marking the beginning of one-half of the Green Revolution and 
instilling confidence in the search for new technology under inter- 
national auspices. 
Rockefeller and Ford Foundations at forefront 
The second half of the Green Revolution followed the establishment 
in the Philippines in 1960 of the International Rice Research Institute 
(IRRI), the first of its kind, through the joint efforts of the Ford and 
Rockefeller Foundations. The idea had been mooted in 1954 in a paper 
by two Rockefeller Foundation officials, Warren Weaver and Harrar. 
Following visits to Asia in 19.52 and 1953, they had concluded that 
“many of the fundamental physiological, biochemical and genetic prob- 
lems are essentially independent of geography, and they are certainly 
independent of political boundaries.” They felt an international institute 
would be the most cost-effective way to concentrate expensive equip- 
ment and assemble talents from around the world to work under 
optimal conditions. Their proposal called for operating expenses to be 
met jointly by major rice-producing countries of Asia, while the capital 
investment would come from the foundation. It fell through because 
each of the countries approached said it would gladly support a research 
institute, but only if it was located in its territory. 
Forrest Hill, who joined the Ford Foundation as its vice president 
for overseas development in 1955, visited India the next year to take 
a look at Ford-assisted work which focused on community development 
as the means to improve rural incomes. He came to recognize that 
improvement of crop yields through new technology, as well as a capa- 
city to absorb and apply it, was an indispensable condition for making 
any significant headway. 
At a meeting of officials of the two foundations in 1958, Hill sug- 
gested to Harrar that the foundations collaborate in rice research, draw- 
ing on their respective strengths. This started consultations, culminating 
in Ford agreeing to provide capital funds and Rockefeller the scien- 
tific staff, some brought in from its work in Mexico, to set up IRRI. 
As it happened, Hill and Harrar, working for their respective founda- 
tions, commuted together to New York City from the suburb of 
Scarsdale, New York from time to time. The friendship of the two men 
made possible close collaboration between the two foundations, marked 
by fewer frictions than one might expect even within any single large 
organization. 
Borlaug’s work in Mexico had pointed the direction that IRRI’s 
research should take. From multiple crossings between dwarf and tall 
varieties, the most successful was that made between Peta, a tall Indo- 
nesian variety then widely grown in the Philippines, and Dee-geo-woo- 
gen, a Taiwanese variety thought to have been transferred from south- 
ern China several hundred years earlier. Following highly promising 
trials in several Asian locations, IRRI released its first named variety, 
IR8, in 1966. Its rapid adoption throughout the rice-growing areas 
of Asia came as a pleasant surprise to both Harrar and Hill. They 
had envisaged a time horizon of 10-15 years to develop a dwarf rice 
variety. In fact, it took only four from the time IRRI research got under 
wav. 
“Following a visit by Mexico’s President Lopez Mateos to the Philip- 
pines in 1963, Rockefeller’s Mexican program was transformed by 1966 
into CIMMYT. This was to be an international program to link Mex- 
ican wheat and maize varieties with other breeding programs around 
the world. The new Rockefeller initiative followed the end of the na- 
tional program with Mexico for which the latter assumed full charge 
in 1962. Rockefeller shifted to an international focus, partly because 
of encouragement from Ford which began sharing operating costs from 
1967. 
At left is Syntha, a traditional tall rice plant from 
Indonesia, and at right is higher-yielding IR8, a semi- 
dwarf rice that was rapidly adopted by farmers 
throughout Asia in the 1960s. 
Broadening involvement 
Successes in rice and wheat led Harrar and Hill to envisage the estab- 
lishment of additional centers “at strategic points in the undeveloped 
world.” The first such center was IITA with responsibility for the 
improvement of agriculture in a specific ecological zone, the low, humid 
tropics. The charter of IITA was promulgated by a decree of the 
Nigerian government in July 1967. Though the host government gave 
strong support, work proceeded slowly because of civil war in the coun- 
try. The research program got under way in 1970, while construction 
of facilities was completed in 1972. 
The fourth and last of the centers launched by the two foundations 
was CIAT. It grew out of a cooperative agricultural program with Col- 
ombia begun by Rockefeller in 1950, following the initial successes of 
the Mexican program. The proposal, made jointly by Ford and 
Rockefeller officials, was that the institute, like IITA, should have a 
regional orientation. Ford’s decision-makers had some initial reserva- 
tions about the research program, but the foundation joined as an equal 
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partner in sharing CIAT’s operating costs within three years of its foun- 
ding in 1966. 
By 1967, the four institutes were in various stages of planning, con- 
struction and operation, and costs were beginning to mount rapidly. 
The foundations recognized that the finances they themselves could 
provide would not be sufficient to permit the centers to reach their full 
potential. Moreover, the early success of CIMMYT and IRRI had given 
rise to proposals for additional institutes to work on other crops or 
regions. Recognizing the resource gap, estimated by Hill in mid-1968 
at US$5 million to US$lO million for the four institutes, he felt the time 
had come to “go public.” 
Following the lifting of a Congressional ban on assistance for food 
crops that might limit U.S. exports, prompted by the acute food short- 
ages in South Asia in the mid-1960s, John Hannah, administrator of 
the U.S. Agency for International Development, was receptive to the 
foundations’ plea for support. The Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA) and its president, Maurice Strong, were also respon- 
sive, but parliamentary approval was delayed as Canadian wheat was 
piling up at the time in warehouses as a result of bumper harvests. An 
approach was also made to the U.N. Development Programme in 
1967-68 but with no immediate results. 
Bellagio meetings 
FAO director-general Addeke Boerma had, in one of his first actions 
as the head of the U.N. agency, called a meeting in 1968 at U.N. head- 
quarters in New York to promote coordination of agricultural aid for 
the developing countries. Attended, among others, by officials of FAO, 
UNDP, the World Bank and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the 
meeting considered the idea of convening a conference under U.N. 
auspices to push the concept of coordination. The two foundations had 
reservations, however, about a large formal meeting in which govern- 
ment officials would predominate. Sterling Wortman, director of 
agricultural research of the Rockefeller Foundation, proposed a small, 
informal gathering of heads of agencies and organizations working on 
agricultural problems of the developing countries. Held at the 
Rockefeller conference facility in Bellagio, Italy, on April 23-25, 1969, 
it was a landmark in the events leading to the formation of the CGIAR. 
The participants at Bellagio were the heads of FAO, UNDP and 
the World Bank, the heads of British, Canadian, Swedish and U.S. aid 
organizations, and senior representatives of the Asian Development 
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and Japan’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, in addition to top officials of both foundations. It was 
a disparate group of individuals, some of whom had never met before 
and had no experience of working together. The meeting did not begin 
to come to grips with the need for research on new technology under 
international auspices until Hill, in a homespun and persuasive presen- 
tation, described how new varieties were transforming agriculture in 
areas like India’s Punjab. 
Later in the discussion, Robert S. McNamara, president of the 
World Bank, raised the idea of forming a consultative group or con- 
sortium to mobilize funds. Hannah promptly seconded the idea, indi- 
cating the U.S. government would consider contributing 25 percent 
of whatever amount the others could raise. The new technology and 
the new means to fund it were beginning to fall in place. “The impor- 
tance of vastly superior technologies of production was a thread run- 
ning through the entire meeting,” as the informal summary of pro- 
ceedings put it. 
The Bellagio meeting envisaged multilateral and bilateral support 
for a hierarchy of research institutions, ranging from international in- 
stitutes to regional and national agencies. While there was a consen- 
sus on additional support for the existing four institutes, and even on 
funding some new ones, the modality of mobilizing resources was left 
vague. 
Perhaps the key to the meeting’s success was its particular amalgam 
of scientists and aid administrators. As Wortman said later: “While 
those of us who were scientists thought we knew roughly what was Forrest F. Hill 
needed, we had no idea what might be done to marshal funds and 
expand the system. It was here that McNamara, Hoffman (of UNDP), 
Hannah, and Wilson (of Britain’s Overseas Development Ministry) and 
others excelled.” Indeed, they did. In the course of three days, the 
Bellagio meeting progressed from a general consideration of broad 
issues of agricultural development to focus on a highly promising 
avenue for initiatives to deal with the problem of world hunger. The 
meeting ended with a decision by the participants to meet again a year 
later. 
On the donor side, DAC (Development Assistance Committee of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) was 
the first off the mark. Its chairman, Edwin M. Martin, was at Bellagio. 
At an informal meeting of experts held within weeks of Bellagio, strong 
interest was expressed by a number of country representatives in pro- 
moting agricultural research in the developing countries under inter- 
national auspices. Rockefeller Foundation’s Will M. Myers, who chaired 
the Bellagio gathering, was asked to suggest precise forms of assistance 
to the international institutes. His only suggestion for any kind of um- 
brella organization was that the DAC secretariat could serve as an inter- 
mediary, at least for arranging initial contacts, between institutes and 
aid agencies. 
UNDP also responded promptly. At a governing council meeting 
in June 1969, Paul Hoffman, head of the agency, referred to Bellagio 
and expressed his personal opinion that “on the basis of what had 
already been accomplished by basic research in certain agricultural 
fields, UNDP participation is almost obligatory.” 
FAO was already assisting a number of projects to help develop- 
ing countries adopt new varieties to increase food production-an out- 
come of a 1968 staff paper identifying high-yielding varieties as one 
of the five areas warranting special effort. Within six months of the 
Bellagio meeting, the FAO conference held in November 1969 endorsed 
the organization’s interest and active role in agricultural research. 
In the case of the World Bank, its lending for agriculture was still 
modest, and research as such did not figure in the lending portfolio. 
A staff working paper written in 1967, debating the role the Bank should 
take, found opinions sharply divided. But this was before Bellagio. Fired 
by enthusiasm following his participation in the April 1969 meeting, 
McNamara launched a campaign to make the Bank the lead agency 
in mobilizing funds for agricultural research. Staff work to flesh out 
a specific proposal began in earnest. 
Cosponsorship 
At the annual meeting in September of the Bank’s Board of Governors, 
McNamara said in his opening statement that the Bank was ready to 
offer both technical advice and financial assistance in dealing with the 
numerous problems that would have to be solved “if the hopes for the 
Green Revolution are to remain green.” He added: “There is something 
further that I am convinced we ought to do. We should assume a greater 
role of leadership in promoting the agricultural research of today that 
will be the foundation of greater agricultural growth tomorrow.” He 
called for “a new and sustained effort in applied research,” jointly with 
the developing countries and with support from the Bank, FAO, 
bilateral aid agencies and the foundations. The following month, 
McNamara wrote to the heads of FAO and UNDP inviting them to join 
the effort. The two agencies accepted in principle. This was the first 
formal step towards the establishment, with the three agencies as 
cosponsors, of what would eventually be called the CGIAR. 
The foundations warmly welcomed McNamara’s initiatives, but 
there was a difference of opinion on how the international research 
effort should be managed. Although none of the would-be cosponsors 
contemplated taking a direct part in the management of existing or new 
research institutes, the three agencies envisaged a more formal and 
active role for a consortium or consultative group than the foundations 
thought desirable. 
Differences over the need for, and the role of, a consultative group 
narrowed following another meeting in February 1970 at Bellagio, or 
Bellagio II as it came to be called. This was a meeting of senior technical 
officials-representing a wider range of development agencies than 
those attending Bellagio I-to prepare for the second meeting of agency 
heads. A World Bank paper envisaged mobilizing resources through 
“a loose organizational framework, along the lines of consultative 
groups which have been set up to coordinate development assistance” 
to individual countries. The Bank was prepared to provide a secretariat 
and administer a general fund to which some donors might wish to 
contribute if they had difficulties in financing institutes directly. While 
some representation of donors on the boards of trustees would be appro- 
priate, the group would not undertake any management or program- 
ming role, Bellagio II accepted this idea in principle, although some 
differences of approach remained. 
The heads of agencies, meeting at Bellagio in April 1970, ended 
the debate by endorsing the idea of a consultative group, and urging 
the World Bank to take the initiative in setting up the group in con- 
sultation with FAO and UNDP. The meeting, Bellagio III, also autho- 
rized five feasibility studies out of a list drawn up by experts at the 
February meeting. 
The scene now shifted to Washington. McNamara had unexpected 
problems in persuading the World Bank’s Board of Executive Direc- 
tors to authorize the role that the Bank had been asked to assume. He 
sent a memorandum to the Board in March 1970, after taking the 
unusual step of clearing it not only with the heads of FAO and UNDP 
but also with the two foundations. The memorandum reiterated the pro- 
posal for a consultative group serviced by a secretariat provided by the 
Robert S. McNamara 
Bank. The Bank, it was suggested, should itself make a limited finan- 
cial contribution in the form of grants for agricultural research. 
The response from executive directors was generally favorable but 
some had significant reservations, leading to postponement of the 
scheduled discussion. However, the Bank went ahead and convened 
a meeting at UNDP headquarters in May to work out details of the con- 
sultative group proposal. The three would-be cosponsors met first as 
an executive committee, and were later joined by representatives of 
the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank. David Hopper, then head of Canada’s newly established 
International Development Research Centre, attended as an observer. 
The New York meeting reached a consensus on several key issues. 
However, the first meeting of the Executive Committee was also the 
last. Other donors were not prepared to relinquish to the three cospon- 
sors the degree of control implicit in the arrangement. 
Still, the World Bank’s Board had not yet reached a consensus. 
When the Board met on July 23 and 30, there was wide support for 
the initiative but some dissent as well. Some argued that FAO, not the 
Bank, should take the lead in setting up a consultative group. Even 
before these meetings, discussions with FAO at the staff level had settled 
that it should take the lead in scientific and technical matters (including 
appointment of the chairman of a technical advisory group), and the 
Bank on financial and administrative matters. 
Noting the strong reservations expressed by some executive direc- 
tors, McNamara proposed as a next step consultations with the govern- 
ments they represented to see if a consensus could be reached. Mean- 
while, plans to hold the first meeting of the consultative group in Octo- 
ber or November were quietly shelved. An intensive round of discus- 
sions took place in Washington and several European capitals. Some 
key governments softened their opposition or reservation to a point that 
McNamara could inform the executive directors on October 30 that 
no objection had been raised to holding an exploratory meeting to con- 
sider the establishment, terms of reference and organizational arrange- 
ments for an International Agricultural Research Consultative Group 
“or some comparable mechanism.” 
In preparation for the meeting scheduled for January 1971, another 
was held the preceding month in New York, headquarters of the Ford 
and Rockefeller Foundations. This meeting, now described as Bellagio 
IV, had as the principal item on the agenda the feasibility studies com- 
missioned by Bellagio III. While no final judgments were made in 
deference to the forthcoming meeting of the consultative group, it was 
agreed that full funding of existing institutes should take priority over 
any new activities. 
Bellagio IV participants considered the close involvement of the 
foundations essential to the success of the international institutes. The 
foundations agreed to continue their role in the management of the 
existing institutes and to assist in bringing into being one or two new 
institutes if their establishment proved feasible. 
Following the preliminary meeting of January 1971, the first for- 
mal meeting of the CGIAR took place in May 1971-a little over two 
years after Bellagio I. To those familiar with the ways of international 
bureaucracies, this may well be regarded as its own variety of miracle. 
For the heads of a large number of international and bilateral agen- 
cies, or their senior representatives, to meet at such frequent intervals 
as a working party to bring an international organization into being 
is without precedent. This could not have happened without the sense 
of urgency that the heads of the three cosponsoring agencies attached 
to the enterprise and their readiness to sidestep jurisdictional issues 
to bring about a unique partnership among them. No less important 
was the continuing and strong support of the Ford and Rockefeller 
Foundations, and their willingness to share responsibility for the group 
of international institutes they alone had created and carefully nurtured. 
A Commentary 
by Lloyd T. Evans 
Evans is chief research scientist in the Plant Industry Division of the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, 
Canberra, Australia. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society, and has served 
as President of the Australian Academy of Science. A plant physiologist, 
he was a member of the CGIAR’s Technical Advisory Committee from 
1978 to 1983. 
The diverse and far-reaching impact on food production in develop- 
ing countries of the work of the CGIAR centers was assessed in the 
impact study and summarized in last year’s Annual Report. But the 
CGIAR has had another kind of impact, less direct perhaps but of great 
long-term significance, on how agricultural research is both perceived 
and done. It is now seen to be highly productive even in tropical envi- 
ronments, and with a nudge from the CGIAR is becoming globally more 
integrated, more of a “one world” enterprise than any other field of 
biological research. 
Partners against Hunger complements the impact study by 
documenting the ways in which the centers and the CGIAR have helped 
to bring about this quiet revolution. The book is also a rich source of 
insights into how this improbable, genuinely international and highly 
effective “system” has evolved, how it works, and why it is attractive 
to donors, developing countries and research scientists alike. In writing 
it, Baum has had access to many sources not in the public domain, 
which makes the book an enlightening account of the origins and 
development of this experiment in informal international collaboration. 
Not unnaturally, we are told more about the beginnings from the 
perspective of the World Bank than from that of the other sponsors and 
participants, but the account is even-handed and informative. Yet even 
his sources are silent on some matters, such as the origins of TAC, 
which sprang forth fully armed at the meeting in January 1971 with 
no record of why such a body, not mentioned in the earlier discussions 
at Bellagio, should suddenly be thought necessary. And, of course, there 
are times when a discreet chairman must pass over lively human in- 
teractions for the sake of continuing consensus. 
Interactive system 
But my purpose here is to highlight a few aspects of the impact of the 
CGIAR on agricultural research, some of which relate to the individual 
centers and others to the CGIAR as a whole. Throughout, from the very 
first paragraph, Baum refers to the CGIAR as “the system.” This is an 
appropriate word for what the CGIAR has now become, but in its 
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origins it was more “a loose federation of independent centers” or, as 
another founding father put it, “not an organization at all, but an 
arrangement for consultation.” Just as the play by Pirandello had six 
characters in search of an author, so the CGIAR could easily have 
become merely 13 centers in search of a system. But Sir John Crawford 
and the other early architects of the CGIAR had in mind something 
more comprehensive, more integrated, more interactive. 
Of the amount spent on agricultural research, the CGIAR system 
represents only about 7 percent of the total for developing countries 
and less than 2 percent of the world total. It neither can, nor aspires 
to, replace the national research systems, but it can and has played a 
catalytic role in transforming attitudes to agricultural research vis-h- 
vis extension, and to the corporateness of such research. As “the 
system” has itself developed, it has also helped to integrate the 
agricultural research efforts of the Third World, through its networks 
and training activities, and now increasingly involves scientists from 
developed countries in the agricultural problems of the developing ones. 
In building its own system, it has catalyzed the formation of an emerg- 
ing global one. 
Commodity focus 
Sir John Crawford 
But let us look first at some of the ways in which the centers have 
influenced agricultural research. Their first lesson was simple but tell- 
ing, namely the benefits of concentration of effort on a single commod- 
ity or problem if rapid progress is required, a lesson of which even the 
CGIAR needs to keep reminding itself in the face of the temptation to 
tackle ever more problems. Much of the world’s agricultural research 
is organized by discipline, and by focusing on particular crops, the 
centers brought a commodity woof to this disciplinary warp, greatly 
strengthening the fabric of research. Their early success highlighted 
the advantages of strong interactions between disciplines. 
In the early centers, the major interdisciplinary effort was focused 
on plant breeding, which has generated the lion’s share of the impact 
of the CGIAR. Beyond that, however, the way in which the plant 
breeding was done and the goals formulated for it reinforced the whole 
concept of an international center. There were the advantages of scale 
in bringing together at one place a really comprehensive pool of 
genotypes, of making a wide range of crosses between them, and of 
assessing them for many characteristics in many environments. Simi- 
larly the goal of broad adaptability, enunciated so forcefully by Norman 
Borlaug, meshed particularly well with the concept of an international 
center, and was reinforced by the development of more effective ways 
of analyzing the data from far-flung trials. 
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However, without wishing to bite the hand that has fed the CGIAR, 
several further points should be made about the plant breeding ac- 
tivities. The first is that while there are certainly economies of scale 
in the overall process of plant breeding, there are also disadvantages 
when the number of characteristics sought becomes too great. Secondly, 
although the emphasis on broad adaptability has been an effective 
strategy in the earlier stages of the breeding programs, once yield levels 
are moderately high, closer local adaptation may become more impor- 
tant in raising them still further. The greater regionalization of many 
of the CGIAR breeding programs is a recognition of this and a first 
step towards more localized breeding and assessment. 
Such a trend will change but not undermine the role of the inter- 
national centers in plant breeding in the future. Their closer associa- 
tion with, and more immediate knowledge of, the genetic resource col- 
lections, and the scale of their crossing and evaluation programs will 
continue to be of immense value to the world-wide plant breeding enter- 
prise in the generation of useful new combinations, but the varietal 
finishing schools will probably be increasingly decentralized. 
Continuing challenges 
The genetic resources movement is now so well established that it is 
difficult to recall the sense of emergency that attended its birth. Ironi- 
cally, it was the very success of the CIMMYT and IRRI breeding pro- 
grams that led to concern about the fate of older varieties, land races 
and wild progenitors of the crops in the CGIAR portfolio, and even- 
tually to the decision to establish the IBPGR as catalyst for their effec- 
tive conservation. N. Vavilov and other crop scientists had set the scene, 
and the FAO panel of experts had defined the problem. What was 
needed was a body with the resources and the will to initiate and coor- 
dinate action, a role to which IBPGR acting in conjunction with the 
crop research centers was ideally suited. Between them they have not 
only conserved a vast amount of genetic material for future use by all 
countries, but have also heightened awareness of the value of these 
resources for plant breeding. Now the challenge is to see them better 
evaluated and more widely used, and it is here that the centers with 
the collections should be the prime movers. As a survey of U.S. plant 
breeders by Donald N. Duvick shows, they are often reluctant to use 
wild species or old varieties as a source of genetic variation unless they 
have no alternative, because of the time required to recover full per- 
formance. Genetic engineering techniques may reduce the problem of 
unwanted genes hitch-hiking along with the wanted ones, but there is 
clearly an important role for the centers in making more effective use 
of the accumulated genetic resources in future breeding programs. 
Medium-tall (left) and semi-dwarf (right) durum 
wheat lines are maintained in CIMMYT’s germ- 
plasm unit for use in its breeding program, which 
has historical linkages to joint Rockefeller and Mex- 
ican efforts in the 1940s. 
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Since plant breeding looms so large in “the system,” and played 
so central a part in the concept of international centers, two other 
aspects should be mentioned. Warren Baum deserves our thanks for 
refraining, until almost his last page, from reference to conquests, 
whether of hunger or of pests and diseases. The Churchillian ring of 
such phrases is tempting to authors, but agricultural research is more 
like continuing guerrilla warfare against evolving pest and disease 
organisms than a decisive battle, especially in the tropics. The battle 
is never won, and the task becomes no easier, no less urgent, and no 
less in need of imaginative new approaches. I am talking about what 
has been called maintenance research, for which the CGIAR could pro- 
vide as effective an example of leadership, as it did in the case of genetic 
resources. Such research could be quite as exciting and at least as 
significant as new gap-filling ventures. 
If readers of Baum’s book come away with the impression that the 
CGIAR has given far more attention to plant breeding than to agronomy 
in its drive to increase food production, or even that breeding alone 
suffices, that is not the fault of the author. It is part of the CGIAR 
mythology. Of course, it was the availability of cheaper nitrogenous 
fertilizers that generated the need for shorter-statured crop plants in 
the first place, to avoid lodging, but successive improvements in 
agronomy are also the key to breeding for greater yield potential, as 
well as to greater stability of production. Although there has been much 
innovative agronomic research at the centers, the agronomists are too 
often viewed as handmaidens rather than partners to the breeders. 
Donor enthusiasm for low-input agriculture has also contributed to the 
“poor relation” status of agronomic research in the system as a whole, 
which is all too evident in Partners against Hunger. 
On the other hand, the CGIAR has certainly given a lead to 
agriculturists in both developed and developing countries in the related 
area of farming systems research. The first stripe review, led by John 
Dillon, was on this subject and considered farming systems research 
a highly appropriate activity for the centers because of its need to bring 
together expertise from many disciplines, On the other hand, the local 
specificity of much farming systems research makes it less apt, as the 
Bellagio meeting in 1977 and Norman Simmonds’ review both empha- 
sized. In the face of this wide spectrum of views on the usefulness and 
appropriateness of farming systems research, the CGIAR has experi- 
mented at various levels. There are several commodity centers with 
strong farming system programs; at one center, IITA, the major long- 
term task has been to seek viable alternatives to the bush-fallow system 
used in the humid tropics, although many other activities ebb and flow 
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around this goal; and one center, ILCA, was wholly dedicated to 
research on systems of livestock production. The problems being 
tackled are intractable and complex, and it is still too soon to judge 
the outcome but, whatever the final assessment, the CGIAR will be seen 
to have taken a bold and illuminating step in broadening the scope of 
agricultural research. 
A related general question concerns the stability of food produc- 
tion. Here, too, the CGIAR is able to give comprehensive leadership 
in analysis of the problems, across an unparalleled array of commodities 
and regions, and at all levels of organization, whether of the individual 
crop variety, the farming system or of economic policies. All these levels 
were engaged at a meeting in Feldafing (Federal Republic of Germany] 
in 1985, initiated by IFPRI in conjunction with the Deutsche Stiftung 
fur Internationale Entwicklung, which highlighted the unique contribu- 
tion the CGIAR system can make in approaching problems of this 
complexity. 
Catalytic role 
This brings me, finally, to the impact of the CGIAR as a whole, as 
distinct from that of its centers, on agricultural research. As the im- 
pact report points out, what the system decides to do can have quite 
varied effects on both national systems and bilateral aid agencies. They 
may, like the poet Gerard Manley Hopkins, “admire and do otherwise,” 
or they may boost their own efforts to match and interact with those 
by the CGIAR. And, as the impact study also shows, attitudes about 
the usefulness of agricultural research have been transformed. Beyond 
that, however, the CGIAR now sends highly significant signals to the 
research systems of both developed and developing countries through 
its discussions on priorities, on the geographic balance of its initiatives, 
its concern for equity, adverse environments, and sustainability. Shifts 
in the explicit goals of the CGIAR as enunciated in successive TAC 
papers on priorities and the Group discussions of them are noted, as 
are the centers’ reactions to them. Given the power of shifts in fashion, 
one of the unsung strengths of “the system” is that the changing enthu- 
siasms of both centers and donors can be tempered by the CGIAR, on 
the one hand, and by strong, autonomous boards of trustees, on the 
other-a point that is not altogether apparent in the Olympian perspec- 
tive of how “the system” works which is given in Partners against 
Hunger. On the matter of adverse environments and equity, for exam- 
ple, the centers may be more acutely aware than the donors of the fre- 
quently strong inverse relationship between the need to solve a prob- 
lem and its likely solubility. 
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This is not the place to debate current priorities, but the way TAC 
and the CGIAR have gone about defining these, as well as the priorities 
themselves, has had a major impact on the conduct of similar exercises 
in both the developing and the developed world. More Cartesian 
approaches are possible these days, but it is the collective experience 
and judgment brought together in the system as a whole which gives 
special weight to the priorities of the CGIAR. 
This gravitas in its approach, the profusion of its networks, alumni 
and contacts in developing countries, the comprehensiveness of its 
research and documentation services, and the strength of the logistic 
support it can provide, make the CGIAR magnetic not only for 
agricultural scientists in developing countries but also for those in 
developed countries who want to bring their skills and imagination to 
bear on the world food problem. Increasingly the international centers 
are acting as marriage brokers between developed country scientists 
and developing country problems. They are the catalysts bringing the 
agricultural scientists of the world together to work more effectively 
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